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Abstract 
 
Firm’s proper acquisition size is still an unresolved question. The extant literatures 
mention little about the determinants of firm’s acquisition size at micro economic level. 
With recent available data of acquisitions in Chinese stock market (Shanghai and 
Shenzhen) during 2003-2008, we estimate the effect of institutional ownership on firms’ 
acquisition size controlling financial and governance characteristics. In an industry fixed 
effect model, firms’ acquisition size is significantly and positively associated with firm size, 
Tobin’s Q, leverage ratio, cash holing level and internal capital expenditure. Acquisition 
size is positively related to some governance characteristics of firms such as board size, 
independency of board and activity of board, but negatively related to the duality of 
chairman and CEO. However, annual dividend, management holding, intangible asset, 
ownership concentration and the identity of ownership seems unrelated to acquisition size. 
The monitoring effect of different institutional ownership including qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII), social security fund (SSF), security firms (SF) and security 
investment funds (SIF) on the acquisition of listed firms are investigated. We find that 
QFII and SIF increase acquisition size of those over-acquisition firms while only SSF 
have significant monitoring effects on those under-acquisition firms.  
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I. Introduction 
 
What’s a firm’s proper acquisition size? It is still an unresolved question for both academics and 
practitioners. The extant literatures mention little about the determinants of firm’s acquisition 
scale at the micro economic level. This paper tries to fill this gap using recent available data from 
Chinese stock market (Shanghai and Shenzhen) over the period 2003-2008.  
 
Generally, the more prosperous is the capital market, the bigger acquisition size would be (Golbe 
and White 1988, p25-47). Anderson (1997) finds that acquisition would be fit when the market is 
saturated, while internal investment is more suitable if the industry is low concentrated and less 
competitive. He also points out that the different regulation policy also impacts on the possibility 
of acquisition in terms of industry. If certain industry is full of fragmented supplier and 
excessively predatory pricing, regulator would encourage acquisition to integrate the market. 
Harford (2005) documents the occurrence of shocks, such as the technique development, 
deregulation, plus the sufficient macro liquidity, forces the firm to adapt to the new change by 
acquisition, explained the explosive development of US five merger waves. Thus, market 
structure, macroeconomic environment and the industry characteristics would impact firms’ 
acquisition activity. 
 
Another strand of literatures concentrates on the financial characteristics and corporate 
governance of acquiring firms. Firstly, economic resource (or asset) of acquiring firms is 
important factor to decide whether and how much the firms should acquire. Small firms 
(measured as sales or total assets) are thought to be likely to grow through merger and acquisition 
(Dubin 1975), while more recent research (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; and Hubbard 1998) suggests 
that acquisition size increases in firm size significantly. Rubin (1973) invents a model of firm 
investment-expansion based on resource theory and argue that firm may choose to acquire if the 
acquirer own a strong expertise, such as R&D department or financial department. His argument 
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shows the off-balanced resource owned by acquirer would influence the decision to invest.2 Debt 
and capital expenditure are important determinants to acquisition size. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that increasing debt may reduce the expropriation by managers. Myers (1977) demonstrates 
that the excessive debt would reduce the projects with positive net present value, and result in 
underinvestment. Jensen (1986) continues his argument that debt would exercise a hard constrains 
on manager’s investment, and the financial leverage is negatively related with the over investment. 
Since capital expenditure may be substitutionary investment to acquisition, Mills et al. (1995) and 
Lang et al. (1996) find that debt is negatively related to capital expenditure.  
 
Moreover, cash dividend payout is also a very important indicator of financial resource. Managers 
face the conflicting choices between cash dividend and acquisition, both of which are cash out. 
Jensen (1986) argues that the more cash the firm owns the easier the firm acquisition will harm 
shareholder interest. Hence, managers may prefer acquisition rather than pay cash dividend. His 
argument has been cited by many authors as the Jensen free cash flow hypothesis. Among others, 
Hoshi et al. (1991) for Japan and Chapman et al. (1996) for Australia empirically test free cash 
flow hypothesis by using different countries data and reach the consensus that firms suffer the 
financing constrains as they invest. Malmendier and Tate (2005) find a strong positive relation 
between the sensitivity of investment to cash flow and executive over-confidence. Lang et al. 
(1991) develop a measure of free cash flow using Tobin's q to distinguish between firms that have 
good investment opportunities and those that do not.3 They find that value could be created 
through acquisition if high Tobin’s Q firm acquires low Tobin’s Q firm. Hence, we follow this 
tradition to use Q as proxy for investment opportunity of acquiring firms in this paper.  
 
Secondly, M&A is strategic investment and must be approved by the board of director before any 
action was taken. Acquisition size should be affected by the corporate governance mechanism. 
                                                             
2
 We use intangible asset as the proxy for the non-tangible resources. 
3
 Tobin’s Q is developed by James Tobin in 1969 as the ratio between the market value and replacement cost of total 
asset. It reflects the capital market expectation to the asset. Q’s implication is very comprehensive, as proxy of the 
firm’s investment opportunity, market evaluation and firm valuation, growth opportunity and management capability. 
5 
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that the board suffers from dysfunction if board size increases 
beyond the limit (about 9 members from their results). Although monitoring function could 
increase accompanying board size, the growing board size would result in slow decision making, 
less fair-minded discussion about the managerial performance, and cause the monitoring cost 
overrun the reward. How frequently the board meeting should be called on relies on whether there 
is a significant relation between the meeting frequency and operating performance. Lipton and 
Lorch (1992) show that more board meeting times will lead to enhanced effectiveness of the 
board. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) present evidence that a large board would not be as 
effective as small one. Vafeas (1999) finds that the frequency of board meeting is empirically 
negatively associated with the firm value.  
 
Consequently, position of independent director is designed to protect the interests of minor 
shareholders. It is supposed to monitor the large shareholder and management. However, 
empirical research show mix-up results on the effect of independent director. Boyd et al. (1994) 
finds that CEO compensation is directly related to the ratio of independent director in the board. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) empirically demonstrate that the higher ratio of independent 
director in board would make favorite decision to firm in the events of CEO turnover, CEO 
compensation, poison pills and hostile takeover. Moreover, some researchers (e.g., Boyd, 1995; 
Baliga et al., 1996) argue that duality of CEO and chairman would help to be creative and 
effective in decision making, information sharing and communication, thereafter to improve the 
operating performance or no much difference of the two type of leadership. However, 
principle-agency theory implies the departure of chair of board and CEO in that person is born to 
be slack and opportunistic. An effective monitoring mechanism needs to be designed to prevent 
from moral hazard and adverse selection. CEO duality indicates that manager monitors himself, 
which deviate from person’s nature of the self interests. The person holding position of chair 
should be different from that holding CEO to maintain the independency and effectiveness of the 
board (Goyal and Park 2000).  
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Since the takeover market in China is still in the infancy stage and almost no anti-taken case 
happens during 2003-2008, so we ignore the relation between anti-takeover and the acquisition 
size in this paper. One differential characteristic of Chinese listed firm from other public firm is 
that a large proportion shares owned by the governments at different levels. Chen et al. (2008) 
argued that China state owned listing companies confronted risks of managerial entrenchment, 
and managerial agent issue is quite different from other firms owned by private shareholders 
hence the investment behavior differs significantly. Therefore, characteristics of board, including 
the size of board, annual board meeting times, the extent of independence of the board members 
from the management, CEO duality, the identity of largest shareholder (state or private) will be 
taken into account with regard to expected acquisition size in Chinese financial market.4 
 
Finally, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998), and Kahn and Winton (1998) analyze the 
choices faced by institution shareholders, either exerting monitoring effect on management in an 
attempt for shared gains or trading for private gains. However, empirical work is mixed 
concerning the benefits of ownership by institutional shareholders. On one hand, the institutional 
investors are found to be inactive in corporate governance by many authors. Black (1990) argues 
that the institutional shareholders suffer conflicts of interest and remain pro-manager. Roe (1994) 
argues that legal restrictions prevent banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds from owning 
large blocks of shares, and reduce their incentives to monitor. Parrino et al. (2003) find some 
institutional shareholders vote with their feet by selling their shares as long as they are not 
satisfied with the performance of the management. Gaspar et al. (2005) find institutional investors 
with high-turnover portfolios exert little influence on managers with regard to acquisition 
decision.  
 
On the other hand, some types of institutional investors exert influence on corporate events, such 
                                                             
4
 The proper acquisition size is also impacted seriously by the detailed process of deal, including the target selection, 
fitness auditing between acquirer and target, acquisition timing and payout methods (cash or stock), whether is there 
any third party to contest. The management’s decision about these details, such as excessively over payment, wrong 
timing to acquire or just to fulfill the task or assignment without clear strategic planning, reflects his intention to deviate 
from shareholder’s interest. All these are resources of management agency problem and reflected in the residual error 
calculated based on our specification.  
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as takeover amendments, R&D investment decisions, and CEO compensation (e.g. Borokhovich 
et al., 2006). Qiu (2008) finds that PPFs (public pension funds) reduce the likelihood of bad 
M&A, but no effect on good M&A. The PPFs has also been discussed in Black (1990), which 
suggests the institutional shareholder activism is very prominent in PPFs (public pension funds) 
due to its size and independence, which cannot be shared by most corporate pension fund. Some 
other characteristics also encourage PPFs’ monitoring effect in corporate governance. First, PPFs 
retain effective voting control of their assets. In 1993, PPFs in US retained voting control over 98.9% 
of the stock they owned, compared to only 66.4% for the average institutional investor (Brancato, 
1993). Furthermore, indexing strategies are common among PPFs. Gillan and Starks (2000) suggest 
selling constraints imposed by indexing strategies provide a motivation for shareholder activism. 
Davis and Steil (2001) document that indexation takes 54% of public pension funds’ domestic equity 
and only 24% of that of corporate fund.5  
 
We need explore what kind of institutional investors could effectively monitor acquisition size 
controlling financial and governance characteristics. With recent available data in Chinese stock 
market (Shanghai and Shenzhen) during the period 2003-2008, we estimate the expected 
acquisition size using an industry fixed effect model. We hypothesize that there should be a proper 
acquisition size based on the characteristics of acquiring firms. After we obtain the expected size, 
we analyze the monitoring effect of institutional investors. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section II describes our data and applies a two-step specification on the 
acquisition equation and the institutional ownership equation. Section III presents the basic results 
and discusses institutional ownership impact on acquisition size. Section IV concludes the paper. 
II. Data and Methodology 
The empirical tests employ the CCER (China Center for Economic Research) PLC database of 
financial statement, corporate governance and institutional shareholders. This dataset include all 
                                                             
5 However, some disagree with the conclusion that PPFs are effective monitors. Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) find 
more conservative behavior by state pension fund. Woidtke (2002) finds the negative relationship between firm relative 
values and public pension ownership. 
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PLCs in Chinese stock market (Shanghai and Shenzhen) which have successful acquisitions. The 
sample period covers the fiscal years 2003-2008. We exclude PLCs subject to special treatment 
(ST, that is, firms reporting two consecutive annual losses) and financial institutions (Global 
Industry Standard Classification between 401010 and 403030) because investing and financing 
activities are ambiguous for these firms. Then, we have 2117 firm-year observations on annual 
acquisition size.  
 
Table 1 shows the 2117 observations of annual acquisition size from 2003 to 2008 in Chinese 
capital market. The sum of all deals total up to 797.6 billion RMB Yuan (￥, that is approximate 
105 billion US dollar or 53 billion pounds in 2007).6 Furthermore, the pattern of the deal is time 
varying, with much larger deals and more firm-year observations in 2007 (476 obvs, average 
annual size 0.59 billion￥) and 2008 (515 obvs, average annual size 0.54 billion￥) compared to 
two low periods of 2003 (299 obvs, average annual size 0.17 billion￥) and 2005 (239 obvs, 
average annual size 0.15 billion￥). Thus, more and more Chinese PLCs are now involved into 
the acquisition activities, as well as increasing annual acquisition size for individual firm.      
Table 1: Year distribution of acquisition size and frequency 
Year Obvs 
Total 
acquisition 
(billion ￥) 
Average annual 
Acquisition size 
(billion ￥) 
2003 299 50.8 0.17 
2004 296 76.4 0.26 
2005 239 36.0 0.15 
2006 292 78.4 0.27 
2007 476 280.0 0.59 
2008 515 276.0 0.54 
Total 2117 797.6 0.38 
             Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008. 
  
                                                             
6
 We are using the exchange rate of The Penn World Table (PWT 6.3) in 2007 to calculate the equivalent value in US 
dollars and pounds Sterling (1 US dollar=7.6075 RMB Yuan, 1 US dollar=0.4998 pounds Sterling). We keep on using 
the RMB Yuan as the unit of currency in this paper.   
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In terms of industry distribution (table 2), the acquiring firms in China are mainly in Non-daily 
consumption (21.6%), Industrials (20.2%) and Raw materials (18.6%), However, the percentages 
of total acquisition are in different ranking: Industrials (27%), Raw materials (21.7%) and Real 
Estate (17.3%). It is consistent with the much lower average annual acquisition size in the 
Non-daily consumption industry (only 0.19 billion￥) than the average level (0.38 billion￥). We 
find that the average annual acquisition size occurring in industries such as Telecommunication 
Services (2 billion￥), Energy (0.82 billion￥) and Real Estate (0.71 billion￥) are much higher 
than others. It suggests that those more concentrated industries such as Telecommunication 
Services, Energy and Real Estate may have fewer firms participating in acquisition, but their 
acquisition size is much bigger than firms in other industries. Therefore, industry heterogeneity in 
acquisition size demands a better control on industry characteristics.   
 
Table 2: distribution of acquisition based on industry (Global Industry Standard Classification) 
Industry Obvs 
Percentage 
of total Obvs 
(%) 
Total 
acquisition  
(billion ￥) 
Percentage 
of total 
acquisition 
(%) 
Average 
annual 
Acquisition 
size 
(billion ￥) 
Energy 61 2.9 50.2 6.3 0.82 
Raw materials 390 18.6 172.0 21.7 0.44 
Industrials 424 20.2 214.0 27.0 0.50 
Non-daily 
consumption 453 21.6 87.8 11.1 0.19 
Daily Consumptions 144 6.9 19.6 2.5 0.14 
Medical and health 
care 
158 7.5 27.1 3.4 0.17 
Real Estate 192 9.2 137.0 17.3 0.71 
IT 157 7.5 16.9 2.1 0.11 
Telecommunication 
Services 5 0.2 10.0 1.3 2.00 
Public utility 114 5.4 58.5 7.4 0.51 
Total 2098 100.0 793.1 100.0 0.38 
Data source: the CCER PLC database 2003-2008. 
 
We follow the same strategy in Richardson (2006) to analyze the over/under investment problem 
given the financial constraints such as cash flow and corporate governance environment. Since 
acquisition is a part of investment expenditure, we assume the factors influencing the size of 
investment will also affect acquisition size. In the first step, we decompose the acquisition size of 
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firm i in the industry j and year t, i.e. ASijt into two parts: expected acquisition size, E(ASijt |Finijt, 
Goverijt, Yeart, Indj) given known financial constraints (Finijt), corporate governance environment 
(Goverijt), macroeconomic time dynamics(Yeart) and industry fixed effects (Indj), and the 
residual/unexpected acquisition size (ASRijt), which could be expressed as follows:  
 
ASijt = E(ASijt |Finijt, Goverijt, Yeart, Indj) +ASRijt                  (1) 
 
 
The difference between actual acquisition size and expected acquisition size cannot be captured 
by the first step model. Negative (positive) values of residual acquisition size (ARit) correspond to 
under- (over-) acquisition. Assuming a Translog acquisition function, under- (over-) acquisition 
has a residual acquisition size less (more) than 1 in a log form equation as follows:  
 
 
)2(ln 43210 ijtjtijtijtijt IndYearGoverFinAS εβββββ +++++=  
 
where lnASit is the log form annual acquisition size of firm i in the industry j and year t; β0 is the 
constant term; β1 is the vector of coefficients of financial variables (Finijt) including Qijt (Tobins’ Q 
ratio, book value of total assets deflated by market value of total assets, indicating the growth 
opportunity); Leverageijt (book value of total debt deflated by the book value of total asset); 
lnCashijt is the log of annual cash holding, including cash and tradable financial assets; lnCapexpijt 
is the log of capital expenditure (the cash payment on purchasing fixed asset, intangible asset and 
other fixed asset minus the cash received by selling fixed asset, intangible asset and other fixed 
asset, a measure of internal investment); lnSalesijt is log of annual sales as a proxy for firm size; 
lnIntastijt is log of intangible asset of the firm; and CashDivijt is annual cash dividend payout.  
 
β2 is the vector of coefficients of corporate governance variables (Goverijt) including 
Magtholdingijt is the shares percentage holding by senior management; BoardSizeijt is the number 
of directors of a company; Meetingtimesijt is the board meeting times per annum; Inddpropijt is 
portion of number of independent directors among board members; Nationalownedijt is dummy 
representing the ownership (status of the largest share-holder having 7 different natures, designate 
1 as state owned company and 0 for all others); Dualityijt is CEO duality, representing leadership 
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structure of board (0 represents the situation that CEO holds the position of Chair of the board of 
Directors, while 1 refers to splitting two positions between two different individuals); 
(Nation*Duality)ijt is an interaction dummy (1 refers to the situation that the company is state 
owned and CEO and chairman is separate, 0 otherwise). Yeart dummies capture time dynamics (t= 
2003…2008) while Industryj is a vector of indicator variables to capture industry fixed effect 
(j=1…10) according to Global Industry Standard Classification, using Energy industry as the 
baseline; εijt is a random error, also the residual unexpected acquisition size.   
 
There are still some factors influencing acquisition size, known but hard to quantify. These factors 
include the some details of deal: the target selection, fitness auditing between acquirer and target, 
acquisition timing and payout methods (cash, stock, or combination of both), whether there is any 
third party to contest. Due to agency cost problem, behaviors by management deviate from 
shareholder’s interest, such as excessively over payment, bad timing to acquire, and blurred 
acquisition motivation. All elements mentioned above are reflected in the residual error which 
cannot be captured by the model. 
 
In second step, we choose those firms with over/under acquisition size to analyze the effect of 
institutional investor on the residual acquisition size. Currently, there are eleven kinds of investors 
in Chinese capital market. They are social security funds, qualified foreign institutional investors, 
insurance firms, occupational funds, trust firms, securities firms, security investment funds 
brokers set financial plans, individuals, and others. Among them, we concentrate on the most 
important four types of institutional investor: social security funds (SS), qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII), securities firms (SF) and securities investment funds (SIF), since 
they are most typical institutional investors in China.  
 
The residual error εijt in the first step has been taken out as an indicator for the under/over 
acquisition in the second step equation. We regress the holding of shares by institutional investors 
and control variables as above on acquisition size again, but also for those acquiring firms with 
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under/over acquisition size. The model to test the impact of institutional investors on discretionary 
acquisition could be expressed in the following equation: 
(3)ln 210 ijtijtijtijt controlinsholdingAS δααα +++=
          
 
where lnASijt is still the log form annual acquisition size of firm i in the industry j and year t; 
insholdingijt represents the annual average share proportions held by institutional investors. The 
control variables include all above financial and corporate governance variables, industry and year 
dummies, and a new variable of top 5 shareholders’ proportions in the total shares to represent the 
share concentration; δijt is a random error.7  
III. Empirical Results 
We adopt stepwise method to examine the sensitivity of variables. Four different specifications 
are established to quantify the expected acquisition size in the first step equation. All four 
specifications include year dummies and industry dummies. Table 3 presents the results from 
these models. Column 1 shows the expected signs of variables from theory. The first model in the 
column 2 only includes the firm finance variables, without taking account of the governance 
impact on acquisition size. This simple model shows that variables Tobin’s Q, leverage, 
cash-holding and capital expenditure are significantly positively associated with acquisition size. 
Chinese PLCs do not suffer financial constrains as public firms do in other countries as they are 
better financially supported in terms of acquisition. The fact that cash dividend payout does not 
have important role in the size of acquisition suggests that Chinese listed company does not take 
the dividend into account when making the acquisition decision. There is no significant relation 
could be found between sales/intangible asset and acquisition size. It suggests that firm size is not 
important for acquisition in Chinese PLCs. Resources which acquirer based to acquire target is 
still the tangible asset such as cash rather than the intangible asset such as R&D, branding.  
Based on the first model, extra variables concerning governance characteristics are added into the 
second model to examine whether and how certain governance mechanisms impact the 
                                                             
7
 See detailed variable statistics in Appendix.    
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acquisition size. These governance characteristics include management holding, board size, the 
portion of independent directors in board, board activity. Column 3 shows that, the same variables 
remain the significant impact on acquisition size, consistent with how they behave in the first 
model. Except management holding, all governance characteristics are found to be significantly 
positively related to acquisition size. Giving shares to executives shows a good self-monitoring 
effect. These results confirm findings in literature that bigger board may bring more irresponsible 
acquisition while independent directors could not reduce this problem.   
We further explore another two corporate governance variables (firm ownership and duality of 
CEO) impact on acquisition size. Both of these two variables are dummies. For variable 
Nationalowned, it takes value of 1 if the company is state owned enterprise, and 0 otherwise. For 
variable Duality, it takes value of 1 if the CEO and Chair are held by different individuals and 0 
otherwise. The insignificant coefficient of owner variable indicates that whether the largest 
shareholder is stated owned or not has no significant impact on expected acquisition size. The 
insignificance finding is not consistent with argument that State Owned Enterprises seem to 
acquire more because of the external driving forces exercised by Chinese government at different 
levels. The coefficient for variable CEO duality -0.335, significant at 1% level, indicate that 
controlling for all other factors, the company with CEO duality will have about 33.5% lower 
acquisition size compared to the same company except separation of CEO and chairman. It 
possibly suggests that CEO duality mechanism works in restricting over-acquisition. The last 
column has a sensitivity test to examine the relation of the identity and separation of duality with 
regard to expected acquisition size. We design an interaction term by multiplying owner and 
duality, identifying the effect of the state owned PLCs with departed CEO and Chair on 
acquisition size. No significant coefficient found for this interacted variable confirms our finding 
that acquisition decision is not related to national ownership.   
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Table 3: Regression analysis of expected acquisition size, first step 
 
Predicted 
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q + 0.106** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 
  
 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
Leverage + 0.693*** 0.440* 0.429* 0.430*   
  
 0.255 0.254 0.254 0.254 
lncashh + 0.201*** 0.178*** 0.172*** 0.173*** 
  
 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 
lncapexp + 0.256*** 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 
  
 0.03 0.029 0.03 0.03 
dividend + 0.333 0.44 0.443 0.443 
  
 0.312 0.309 0.309 0.309 
lns + 0 0.001 0 0 
  
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
lnintas - -0.01 -0.011 -0.011* -0.011*   
  
 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
magholding -   -2.233*** -2.160*** -2.156*** 
  
 
  0.474 0.493 0.493 
IndDprop -   0.631** 0.656** 0.657**  
  
 
  0.318 0.318 0.318 
Boardsize +   0.069** 0.071** 0.071**  
  
 
  0.03 0.03 0.03 
Meetingtimes +   0.059*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
  
 
  0.012 0.012 0.012 
Nationalowned      0.055 -0.008 
  
 
    0.096 0.279 
Duality -     -0.335** -0.381 
  
 
    0.139 0.234 
Nation*dual -       0.07 
  
 
      0.291 
Industry dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.154 0.176 0.178 0.177 
N  1998 1998 1997 1997 
Notes: The corresponding estimates of standard errors are reported below each coefficient. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
By deducting the expected acquisition size from the actual acquisition size, we find the difference 
which we term as discretionary acquisition size. Our expected acquisition is based on the fourth 
model. The further investigation focuses on the monitoring effect of different institutional 
investors including QFII, SSF, SF and SIF on the unexpected acquisition size of Chinese PLCs. 
We intend to indentify whether any particular or in general, institutional investors will restrict or 
encourage the acquisition size.  
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Table 4 tests the monitoring of institutional investors by regressing different institution’s holding 
percentage plus control variables on acquisition size again. The first column reports the results for 
all acquisitions; the second and third columns are based on over or under acquisition sample, 
defined by residual error more than 1 or not. QIFF, SSF, SF, and SIF represents the annual 
proportions of share holding respectively by these four institutional investors. Top5 indicates the 
annual proration of stock holding by largest 5 shareholders, irrespective of the nature of the 
institutions.  
 
In general, firms with the residual error <1 are regarded as under-acquisition as well as residual 
error >1 is treated as over-acquisition. Table 4 shows the regression results based on the step 2 
regressions for three samples: all firms, over-acquisition firms and under-acquisition firms. All 
control variables shows reasonable and consistent signs with the results in the first step regression. 
But, the effect of institutional ownership shows different results for these three groups. For all 
firms, there is no significant result from institutional ownership. However, for over-acquisition 
firms, if QFII and SIF have higher share proportions, the acquisition size would increase. At the 
same time, for under-acquisition firms, social security fund displays significantly negative effect 
on acquisition size, which is consist with what found in Qiu (2006). Hence, the insignificant effect 
of institutional ownership is due to a mix-up of different firms. Some unobserved characteristics 
of firms, which are captured by the residual acquisition errors are highly correlated with 
institutional ownership. Therefore, social security fund, as the only identified institutional investor, 
could effectively restrict the acquisition size hence be more conservative in investment, while 
QFII and SIF are more active in acquisition.  
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Table 4: Regression analysis on acquisition size, second step 
Variables All-acquisition Over-acquisition Under-acquisition 
Q 0.118*** 0.171*** 0.158*** 
  0.045 0.034 0.053 
Leverage 0.453* 0.471** 0.741**  
  0.255 0.183 0.313 
lncashh 0.161*** 0.132*** 0.153*** 
  0.036 0.023 0.054 
lncapexp 0.222*** 0.244*** 0.265*** 
  0.03 0.02 0.043 
dividend 0.367 0.782*** 0.318 
  0.314 0.247 0.353 
lns 0.001 -0.005 0.007 
  0.005 0.003 0.006 
lnintas -0.012* -0.018*** -0.014*   
  0.007 0.005 0.008 
Magholding -2.130*** -2.058*** -3.487*** 
  0.493 0.321 0.695 
IndDprop 0.608* 0.476** 0.979**  
  0.318 0.219 0.417 
Boardsize 0.067** 0.076*** 0.092**  
  0.03 0.021 0.038 
Meetingtimes 0.058*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 
  0.012 0.009 0.014 
Nationalowned 0.001 0.086 0.004 
  0.279 0.21 0.326 
Duality -0.374 -0.469*** -0.481*   
  0.234 0.174 0.276 
Nationaldual 0.048 0.154 -0.169 
  0.291 0.217 0.343 
QFII 0.015 0.021** -0.006 
  0.012 0.009 0.016 
SSF -0.114 0.056 -0.266**  
  0.1 0.073 0.122 
SF 0 -0.014 0 
  0.025 0.019 0.028 
SIF 0.016 0.017* -0.003 
  0.013 0.009 0.016 
top5 0.007 -0.001 0.009 
  0.009 0.006 0.011 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.179 0.525 0.22 
N 1997 1042 955 
Notes: The corresponding estimates of standard errors are reported below each coefficient. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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IV. Conclusions 
The extant literatures mention little about the determinants of the firm’s acquisition size, especially 
for Chinese firms. With recent available data of acquisition firm-years in Chinese stock market, 
we estimate the expected acquisition size. Our evidence indicates that after controlling for 
industry fixed effect and year dynamics, on average the firms’ acquisition size is significantly 
positively associated with the firm size, Tobin’ q, leverage ratio, cash holing level, internal capital 
expenditure. Acquisition size is found to be positively related to some governance characteristics 
of firms such as management holding, board size, independency of board, activity of board, and 
negatively related to the leadership structure of board, i.e. the duality of chairman and CEO. 
However, other factors such as annual dividend, management holding, intangible asset, ownership 
concentration and the identity of ownership (whether the firm is state owned or not) seems 
unrelated to the acquisition size. Furthermore, we also find that social security fund, as only 
institutional investors, could restrict over-acquisition, while QFII and SIF are more active in 
acquisition. 
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Appendix: Variable Statistics Description 
 
Variable Obvs Mean SD Min Max 
lnAS 2117 17.87 2.02 0.00 24.48 
Q 2117 1.74 1.02 -0.03 4.59 
Leverage 2097 0.50 0.18 0.00 1.90 
lnCash 2097 19.48 1.43 -8.52 24.55 
lnCapExp 2000 18.37 1.87 8.71 26.13 
CashDiv 2100 0.09 0.14 0.00 3.00 
lnSales 2097 17.34 9.66 -8.52 27.67 
lnIntangible 2095 15.97 6.67 -9.21 23.88 
Magtholding 2098 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.78 
Inddprop 2098 0.56 0.15 0.00 1.00 
BoardSize 2098 6.31 1.64 2.00 17.00 
Meetingtimes 2098 9.43 3.80 1.00 36.00 
Owner 2096 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Duality 2098 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Nation*Duality 2096 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
QFII 2117 0.96 4.85 0.00 45.64 
SSF 2117 0.14 0.45 0.00 6.26 
SF 2117 0.29 1.77 0.00 58.37 
SIF 2117 2.43 4.05 0.00 29.08 
top5 2117 6.50 7.81 0.00 58.74 
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